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Abstract
In this paper, we consider both finite and infinite horizon discounted dynamic mean-field games
where there is a large population of homogeneous players sequentially making strategic decisions and
each player is affected by other players through an aggregate population state. Each player has a private
type that only she observes. Such games have been studied in the literature under simplifying assumption
that population state dynamics are stationary. In this paper, we consider non-stationary population state
dynamics and present a novel backward recursive algorithm to compute Markov perfect equilibrium
(MPE) that depend on both, a player’s private type, and current (dynamic) population state. Using this
algorithm, we study a security problem in cyberphysical system where infected nodes put negative
externality on the system, and each node makes a decision to get vaccinated. We numerically compute
MPE of the game.
I. INTRODUCTION
With increasing amount of integration of technology in our society and with recent advance-
ments in computation and algorithmic technologies, there is an unprecedented scale of interaction
among people and devices. With technologies such as ride sharing platforms and social media
apps completely integrated, and new technologies such as cyber physical systems, large scale
renewable energy, electric vehicles, cryptocurrencies and smart grid on the horizon, there is
paramount need to design and understand the behavior of such large scale interactions and their
impact on our society. In this paper, we present a new methodology to analyze such interactions
through mean-field dynamic games.
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2Dynamic games is a powerful tool to model such sequential strategic interaction among selfish
players. There are many other applications such as dynamic auctions, security, markets, traffic
routing, wireless systems, social learning, oligopolies– i.e. competition among firms, and more.
For instance, consider repeated online advertisement auctions, where advertisers place bids for
locations on a website to sell a product. These bids are calculated based on the value of that
product, which is privately observed by the advertiser and past actions of other advertisers, which
are observed publicly. Each advertiser’s goal is to maximize its reward, which for an auction
depends on the actions taken by others.
When players have complete information, an appropriate solution concept for such games is
Markov perfect equilibria (MPE) [1], where players’ strategies depend on a coarser Markovian
state of the systems, instead of the whole history of the game which grows exponentially with
time and thus becomes unwieldy. In general, there exists a backward recursive methodology to
compute non-signaling MPEs of a game i.e. when players’ actions do not reveal any payoff
relevant private information. However, when the number of players is large, computing MPE
becomes intractable
To model the behavior of large population strategic interactions, mean-field games were
introduced independently by Huang, Malhamé, and Caines [2], and Lasry and Lions [3]. In
such games, there are large number of homogenous strategic players, where each player has
infinitesimal affect on system dynamics and is affected by other players through a mean-field
population state. There have been a number of applications such as economic growth, security in
networks, oil production, volatility formation, population dynamics (see [4]–[9] and references
therein).
In this paper, to model the scenarios described above we consider discounted infinite-horizon
dynamic mean-field games where there is a large population of homogenous players sequentially
making strategic decisions and each player is affected by other players through a mean-field
population state. Each player has a private type that evolves through a controlled Markov
process which only she observes and all players observe the current population state which
is the distribution of other players’ types.
The work closest to ours is [10] where authors considered a model in which they studied
stationary equilibria of a mean-field game. In such games, the mean-field dynamics are given by
McKean Vlasov equations which are coupled together with the strategies of the players. Authors
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3in [10] make simplifying assumption on the model that the players are oblivious with respect
to the mean-field statistics, and are playing in the limit such that the mean-field distribution has
converged. This allows them to decouple the mean-field dynamics with that of the rest of the
game.
In this paper, we remove that assumption and consider a more general and realistic model
where players are cognizant i.e. they actively observe the current population state (which need
not have converged) and act based on that population state and their own private state. In such
systems, the update of population state depends on the symmetric equilibrium strategy of the
players while equilibrium strategies are computed using equilibrium update. Thus equilibrium
strategies and population update are interlinked together. We provide a novel backward recursive
algorithm to compute non-stationary, signaling Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) of that game.
Using this framework, we consider malware spread problem in a cyber-physical system where
nodes get infected by an independent random process and for each node, there is a higher risk
of getting infected due to negative externality imposed by other infected players. At each time
t, each player privately observes its own state and publicly observes the population of infected
nodes, based on which it has to make a decision to repair or not. Using our algorithm, we find
equilibrium strategies of the players which are observed to be non-decreasing in the healthy
population state.
Our algorithm is motivated by recent developments in the theory of dynamic games with
asymmetric information in [11]–[15], where authors in these works have considered different
models of such games and provided a sequential decomposition framework to compute Marko-
vian perfect Bayesian equilibria of such games.
A. Notation
We use uppercase letters for random variables and lowercase for their realizations. For any
variable, subscripts represent time indices and superscripts represent player identities. We use
notation −i to represent all players other than player i i.e. −i = {1, 2, . . . i − 1, i + 1, . . . , N}.
We use notation at:t′ to represent the vector (at, at+1, . . . at′) when t
′ ≥ t or an empty vector if
t′ < t. We use a−it to mean (a
1
t , a
2
t , . . . , a
i−1
t , a
i+1
t . . . , a
N
t ) . We remove superscripts or subscripts
if we want to represent the whole vector, for example at represents (a
1
t , . . . , a
N
t ). We denote
the indicator function of any set A by 1{A}. For any finite set S, P(S) represents space of
May 13, 2019 DRAFT
4probability measures on S and |S| represents its cardinality. We denote by P σ (or Eσ) the
probability measure generated by (or expectation with respect to) strategy profile G. We denote
the set of real numbers by R. For a probabilistic strategy profile of players (σit)i∈N where
probability of action ait conditioned on z1:t, x
i
1:t is given by σ
i
t(a
i
t|z1:t, x
i
1:t), we use the short
hand notation σ−it (a
−i
t |z1:t, x
−i
1:t) to represent
∏
j 6=i σ
j
t (a
j
t |z1:t, x
j
1:t). All equalities and inequalities
involving random variables are to be interpreted in a.s. sense.
II. MODEL AND BACKGROUND
We consider both finite and infinite-horizon discrete-time large population sequential game
as follows. There are N homogenous players, where N tends to ∞. We denote the set of
homogenous players by [N ] and with some abuse of notation, set of time by [T] for both finite
and infinite time horizon. In each period t ∈ [T ], player i ∈ [N ] observes a private type xit ∈
X = {1, 2, · · · , Nx} and a common observation zt ∈ Z , takes action ait ∈ A = {1, 2, · · · , Na},
and receives a reward R(xit, a
i
t, zt) which is a function of its current type x
i
t, action a
i
t and the
common observation zt. The common observation zt = (zt(1), zt(2), . . . , zt(Nx)) be the fraction
of population having type x ∈ X at time t i.e.
zt(x) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
1{xit = x}, (1)
where
∑Nx
i=1 zt(i) = 1. Player i’s type evolve as a controlled Markov process,
xit+1 = fx(x
i
t, a
i
t, zt, w
i
t). (2)
The random variables (wit)i,t are assumed to be mutually independent across players and across
time. We also write the above kernel as xit+1 ∼ Qx(·|x
i
t, a
i
t, zt).
In any period t, player i observes (z1:t, x
i
1:t). She takes action a
i
t according to a behavioral
strategy σi = (σit)t, where σ
i
t : (Z)
t × X t → P(A). This implies Ait ∼ σ
i
t(·|z1:t, x
i
1:t).
For finite time-horizon game, GT , each player wants to maximize its total expected discounted
reward over a time horizon T , discounted by discount factor 0 < δ ≤ 1,
J i,T := Eσ
[
T∑
t=1
δt−1R(X it , A
i
t, Zt)
]
. (3)
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5For the infinite time-horizon game, G∞, each player wants to maximize its total expected
discounted reward over an infinite-time horizon discounted by discount factor 0 < δ < 1,
J i,∞ := Eσ
[
∞∑
t=1
δt−1R(X it , A
i
t, Zt)
]
. (4)
A. Solution concept: MPE
The Nash equilibrium (NE) of GT is defined as strategies σ˜ = (σ˜
i
t)i∈[N ],t∈[T ] that satisfy, for
all i ∈ [N ],
E
(σ˜i,σ˜−i)[
T∑
t=1
δt−1R(X it , A
i
t, Zt)] ≥ E
(σi,σ˜−i)[
T∑
t=1
δt−1R(X it , A
i
t, Zt)], (5)
For sequential games, however, a more appropriate equilibrium concept is Markov perfect
equilibrium (MPE) [1], which we use in this paper. We note that an MPE is also a Nash
equilibrium of the game, although not every Nash equilibrium is an MPE. An MPE (σ˜) satisfies
sequential rationality such that for GT , ∀i ∈ [N ], t ∈ [T ], h
i
t ∈ H
i
t, σ
i,
E
(σ˜iσ˜−i)[
T∑
n=t
δn−tR(X in, A
i
n, Zn)|z1:t, x
i
1:t] ≥ E
(σiσ˜−i)[
T∑
n=t
δn−tR(X in, A
i
n, Zn)|z1:t, x
i
1:t], (6)
NE and MPE for G∞ are defined in a similar way where summation in the above equations is
taken such that T is replaced by ∞.
III. A METHODOLOGY TO COMPUTE MPE
In this section, we will provide a backward recursive methodology to compute MPE for both
GT and G∞. We will consider Markovian equilibrium strategies of player i which depend on the
common information at time t, zt, and on its current type x
i
t.
1 Equivalently, player i takes action
of the form Ait ∼ σ
i
t(·|zt, x
i
t). Similar to the common agent approach in [16], an alternate way of
defining the strategies of the players is as follows. We first generate partial function γit : X →
P(A) as a function of zt through an equilibrium generating function θit : Z → (X → P(A))
such that γit = θ
i
t[zt]. Then action A
i
t is generated by applying this prescription function γ
i
t on
player i’s current private information xit, i.e. A
i
t ∼ γ
i
t(·|x
i
t). Thus A
i
t ∼ σ
i
t(·|zt, x
i
t) = θ
i
t[zt](·|x
i
t).
1Note however, that the unilateral deviations of the player are considered in the space of all strategies.
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6We are only interested in symmetric equilibria of such games such that Ait ∼ γt(·|x
i
t) =
θt[zt](·|xit) i.e. there is no dependence of i on the strategies of the players.
For a given symmetric prescription function γt = θ[zt], the statistical mean-field zt evolves
according to the discrete-time McKean Vlasov equation, ∀y ∈ X :
zt+1(y) =
∑
x∈X
∑
a∈A
zt(x)γt(a|x)Qx(y|x, a, zt), (7)
which implies
zt+1 = φ(zt, γt). (8)
A. Backward recursive algorithm for GT
In this subsection, we will provide a methodology to generate MPE ofGT of the form described
above. We define an equilibrium generating function (θt)t∈[T ], where θt : Z → {X → P(A)},
where for each zt, we generate γ˜t = θt[zt]. In addition, we generate a reward-to-go function
(Vt)t∈[T ], where Vt : Z ×X → R. These quantities are generated through a fixed-point equation
as follows.
1. Initialize ∀zT+1, x
i
T+1 ∈ X ,
VT+1(zT+1, x
i
T+1)
△
= 0. (9)
2. For t = T, T − 1, . . . 1, ∀zt, let θt[zt] be generated as follows. Set γ˜t = θt[zt], where γ˜t is the
solution of the following fixed-point equation2, ∀i ∈ [N ], xit ∈ X ,
γ˜t(·|x
i
t) ∈ arg max
γt(·|xit)
E
γt(·|xit)
[
R(xit, A
i
t, zt) + δVt+1(φ(zt, γ˜t), X
i
t+1)|zt, x
i
t
]
, (10)
where expectation in (10) is with respect to random variable (Ait, X
i
t+1) through the measure
γt(a
i
t|x
i
t)Qx(x
i
t+1|x
i
t, a
i
t, zt).We note that the solution of (10), γ˜t, appears both on the left of (10)
and on the right side in the update of zt, and is thus unlike the fixed-point equation found in
Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Furthermore, using the quantity γ˜t found above, define
Vt(zt, x
i
t)
△
=Eγ˜t(·|x
i)
[
R(xit, A
i
t, zt) + δVt+1(φ(zt, γ˜t), X
i
t+1)|zt, x
i
t
]
. (11)
2We discuss the existence of solution of this fixed-point equation in Section III-C
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7Then, an equilibrium strategy is defined as
σ˜it(a
i
t|z1:t, x
i
1:t) = γ˜t(a
i
t|x
i
t), (12)
where γ˜t = θ[zt].
Theorem 1. A strategy (σ˜) constructed from the above algorithm is an MPE of the game i.e.
∀t, hit ∈ H
i
t, σ
i,
E
(σ˜iσ˜−i)[
T∑
n=t
δn−tR(X in, A
i
n, Zn)|z1:t, x
i
1:t] ≥ E
(σiσ˜−i)[
T∑
n=t
δn−tR(X in, A
i
n, Zn)|z1:t, x
i
1:t], (13)
Proof. Please see Appendix C.
B. Backward recursive algorithm for G∞
For the infinite-horizon problem, we assume the reward function R to be absolutely bounded.
We define an equilibrium generating function θ : Z → {X → P(A)}, where for each zt, we
generate γ˜t = θ[zt]. In addition, we generate a reward-to-go function V : Z × X → R. These
quantities are generated through a fixed-point equation as follows.
For all z, set γ˜ = θ[z]. Then (γ˜, V ) are solution of the following fixed-point equation3,
∀z ∈ Z, xi ∈ X ,
γ˜(·|xi) ∈ arg max
γ(·|xi)
E
γ(·|xi)
[
R(xi, Ai, z) + δV (φ(z, γ˜), X i
′
)|z, xi
]
, (14a)
V (z, xi) = Eγ˜(·|x
i)
[
R(xi, Ai, z) + δV (φ(z, γ˜), X i
′
)|z, xi
]
. (14b)
where expectation in (14) is with respect to random variable (Ai, X i,′) through the measure
γ(ai|xi)Qx(xi
′
|xi, ai, z).
Then an equilibrium strategy is defined as
σ˜i(ait|z1:t, x
i
1:t) = γ˜(a
i
t|x
i
t), (15)
where γ˜ = θ[zt].
Theorem 2. A strategy (σ˜) constructed from the above algorithm is an MPE of the game i.e.
∀t, hit ∈ H
i
t, σ
i,
3We discuss the existence of solution of this fixed-point equation in Section III-C
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8E
(σ˜iσ˜−i)[
∞∑
n=t
δn−tR(X in, A
i
n, Zn)|z1:t, x
i
1:t] ≥ E
(σiσ˜−i)[
∞∑
n=t
δn−tR(X in, A
i
n, Zn)|z1:t, x
i
1:t], (16)
Proof. Please see Appendix C.
C. Existence
In this section, we prove existence of a solution of fixed-point equations (10) and (14).
Theorem 3. For the finite horizon game GT , and for every t ∈ {T, T − 1, . . . , 1}, there exists a
solution of the fixed point equation (10).
Proof. Please see Appendix E.
Theorem 4. For the infinite horizon game G∞, there exists a solution of the fixed point equa-
tion (14).
Proof. Please see Appendix F.
IV. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE: CYBER PHYSICAL SECURITY
We first consider a security problem in a cyber physical network with positive externalities. It
is discretized version of the malware problem presented in [7]–[9], [17]. Some other applications
of this model include flu vaccination, entry and exit of firms, investment, network effects. In this
model, suppose there are large number of cyber physical nodes where each node has a private
state xit ∈ {0, 1} where x
i
t = 0 represent ‘healthy’ state and x
i
t = 1 is the infected state. Each
node can take action ait ∈ {0, 1}, where a
i
t = 0 implies "do nothing" and a
i
t = 1 implies repair.
The dynamics are given by
xit+1 =
 x
i
t + (1− x
i
t)w
i
t for a
i
t = 0
0 for ait = 1.
(17)
where wit ∈ {0, 1} is a binary valued random variable with P (w
i
t = 1) = q, which represents the
probability of a node getting infected. Thus if a node doesn’t do anything, it could get infected
with certain probability, however, if it takes repair action, it comes back to the healthy state.
Each node gets a reward
r(xit, a
i
t, zt) = −(k + zt(1))x
i
t − λa
i
t. (18)
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9where zt(1) is the mean-field population state being 1 at time t, λ is the cost of repair and
(k + zt(1)) represents the risk of being infected. We pose it as an infinite horizon discounted
dynamic game. We consider k = 0.2, λ = 0.5, δ = 0.9, q = 0.9 for numerical results presented
in Figures 1-4.
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Fig. 1: γ(1|0): Probability of choosing action 1, given xi = 0
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we consider both finite and infinite horizon, large population dynamic game
where each player is affected by others through a mean-field population state. We present a novel
backward recursive algorithm to compute non-stationary, signaling Markov perfect equilibria
(MPE) for such games, where each player’s strategy depends on its current private type and
current mean-field population state. The non-triviality in the problem is that the update of
population state is coupled to the strategies of the game, and is managed in the algorithm through
unique construction of the fixed-point equations (10),(14). Using this algorithm, we considered
a malware propagation problem where we numerically computed equilibrium strategies of the
players. In general, this algorithm could be used to compute MPEs in a number of applications
such as financial markets, social learning, renewable energy and more.
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Fig. 2: γ(1|1): Probability of choosing action 1, given xi = 1
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APPENDIX A
Proof. We prove (13) using induction and the results in Lemma 1, and 2 proved in Appendix B.
For base case at t = T , ∀i ∈ N , (z1:T , xi1:T ) ∈ H
i
T , σ
i
E
σ˜i
T
σ˜−i
T
{
R(X iT , A
i
T , ZT )
∣∣∣z1:T , xi1:T} = VT (zT , xiT ) (19a)
≥ Eσ
i
T
σ˜−i
T
{
R(X iT , A
i
T , ZT )
∣∣∣z1:T , xi1:T} , (19b)
where (19a) follows from Lemma 2 and (19b) follows from Lemma 1 in Appendix B.
Let the induction hypothesis be that for t+ 1, ∀i ∈ N , z1:t+1 ∈ Hct+1, x
i
1:t+1 ∈ (X )
t+1, σi,
E
σ˜i
t+1:T
σ˜−i
t+1:T
{
T∑
n=t+1
δn−t−1R(X in, A
i
n, Zn)
∣∣∣z1:t+1, xi1:t+1
}
(20a)
≥ Eσ
i
t+1:T
σ˜−i
t+1:T
{
T∑
n=t+1
δn−t−1R(X in, A
i
n, Zn)
∣∣∣z1:t+1, xi1:t+1
}
. (20b)
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Fig. 3: V (g(0), 0) : Reward to go when state xi = 0.
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Fig. 4: V (g(0), 1) : Reward to go when state xi = 1
Then ∀i ∈ N , (z1:t, x
i
1:t) ∈ H
i
t, σ
i, we have
E
σ˜i
t:T
σ˜−i
t:T
{
T∑
n=t
δn−t−1R(X in, A
i
n, Zn)
∣∣∣z1:t, xi1:t
}
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= Vt(zt, x
i
t) (21a)
≥ Eσ
i
tσ˜
−i
t
{
R(X it , A
i
t, Zt) + δV
i
t+1(Zt+1, X
i
t+1)
∣∣∣z1:t, xi1:t} (21b)
= Eσ
i
t σ˜
−i
t
{
R(X it , A
i
t, Zt) + δE
σ˜i
t+1:T
σ˜−i
t+1:T
{
T∑
n=t+1
δn−t−1R(X in, A
i
n, Zn)
∣∣∣z1:t, Zt+1, xi1:t+1
}∣∣∣z1:t, xi1:t
}
(21c)
≥ Eσ
i
tσ˜
−i
t
{
R(X it , A
i
t, Zt)+
δEσ
i
t+1:T
σ˜−i
t+1:T
{
T∑
n=t+1
δn−t−1R(X in, A
i
n, Zn)
∣∣∣z1:t, Zt+1, xi1:t, X it+1
}∣∣∣z1:t, xi1:t
}
(21d)
= Eσ
i
t σ˜
−i
t
{
R(X it , A
i
t, Zt)+
δEσ
i
t:T
σ˜−i
t:T
{
T∑
n=t+1
δn−t−1R(X in, A
i
n, Zn)
∣∣∣z1:t, Zt+1, xi1:t, X it+1
}∣∣∣z1:t, xi1:t} (21e)
= Eσ
i
t:T
σ˜−i
t:T
{
T∑
n=t
δn−tR(X in, A
i
n, Zn)
∣∣∣z1:t, xi1:t
}
, (21f)
where (21a) follows from Lemma 2, (21b) follows from Lemma 1, (21c) follows from Lemma 2,
(21d) follows from induction hypothesis in (20b) and (21e) follows since the random variables
involved in the right conditional expectation do not depend on strategies σit.
APPENDIX B
Lemma 1. ∀t ∈ T , i ∈ N , (z1:t, xi1:t) ∈ H
i
t, σ
i
t
Vt(zt, x
i
t) ≥ E
σitσ˜
−i
t
{
R(X it , A
i
t, Zt) + δVt+1(Zt+1, X
i
t+1)
∣∣∣z1:t, xi1:t} . (22)
Proof. We prove this lemma by contradiction.
Suppose the claim is not true for t. This implies ∃i, σ̂it, ẑ1:t, x̂
i
1:t such that
E
σ̂itσ˜
−i
t
{
R(X it , A
i
t, Zt) + δVt+1(Zt+1, X
i
t+1)
∣∣∣ẑ1:t, x̂i1:t} > Vt(ẑt, x̂it). (23)
We will show that this leads to a contradiction. Construct
γ̂it(a
i
t|x
i
t) =
 σ̂
i
t(a
i
t|ẑ1:t, x̂
i
1:t) x
i
t = x̂
i
t
arbitrary otherwise.
(24)
Then for ẑ1:t, x̂
i
1:t, we have
Vt(ẑt, x̂
i
t)
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= max
γt(·|x̂it)
E
γt(·|x̂it)σ˜
−i
t
{
R(x̂it, A
i
t, ẑt) + δVt+1(φ(ẑt, γ˜t), X
i
t+1)
∣∣∣ẑt, x̂it} , (25a)
≥ Eγ̂
i
t(·|x̂
i
t)σ˜
−i
t
{
R(xit, A
i
t, zt) + δVt+1(φ(ẑt, γ˜t), X
i
t+1)
∣∣∣ẑt, x̂it} (25b)
=
∑
ait,x
i
t+1
{
R(x̂it, a
i
t, ẑt) + δVt+1(φ(ẑt, γ˜t), x
i
t+1)
}
γ̂t(a
i
t|x̂
i
t)Q
i
t(x
i
t+1|x̂
i
t, a
i
t, ẑt)
=
∑
ait,x
i
t+1
{
R(x̂it, a
i
t, ẑt) + δVt+1(φ(ẑt, γ˜t), x
i
t+1)
}
σ̂t(a
i
t|ẑ1:t, x̂
i
1:t)Q
i
t(x
i
t+1|x̂
i
t, a
i
t, ẑt)
= Eσ̂
i
t σ˜
−i
t
{
R(x̂it, a
i
t, ẑt) + δVt+1(φ(ẑt, γ˜t), X
i
t+1)
∣∣∣ẑ1:t, x̂i1:t} (25c)
> Vt(ẑt, x̂
i
t), (25d)
where (25a) follows from definition of Vt in (11), (25c) follows from definition of γ̂
i
t and (25d)
follows from (23). However this leads to a contradiction.
Lemma 2. ∀i ∈ N , t ∈ T , (z1:t, x
i
1:t) ∈ H
i
t,
Vt(zt, x
i
t) = E
σ˜i
t:T
σ˜−i
t:T
{
T∑
n=t
δn−tR(X in, A
i
n, Zn)
∣∣∣z1:t, xi1:t
}
. (26)
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction. For t = T ,
E
σ˜i
T
σ˜−i
T
{
R(X iT , A
i
T , ZT )
∣∣∣z1:T , xi1:T}
=
∑
ai
T
R(xiT , a
i
T , zT )σ˜
i
T (a
i
T |zT , x
i
T ) (27a)
= VT (zT , x
i
T ), (27b)
where (27b) follows from the definition of Vt in (11). Suppose the claim is true for t + 1, i.e.,
∀i ∈ N , t ∈ T , (z1:t+1, x
i
1:t+1) ∈ H
i
t+1
Vt+1(zt+1, x
i
t+1) = E
σ˜i
t+1:T
σ−i
t+1:T
{
T∑
n=t+1
δn−t−1R(X in, A
i
n, Zn)
∣∣∣z1:t+1, xi1:t+1
}
. (28)
Then ∀i ∈ N , t ∈ T , (z1:t, x
i
1:t) ∈ H
i
t, we have
E
σ˜i
t:T
σ˜−i
t:T
{
T∑
n=t
δn−tR(X in, A
i
n, Zn)
∣∣∣z1:t, xi1:t
}
= Eσ˜
i
t:T
σ˜−i
t:T
{
R(X it , A
i
t, Zt)
+δEσ˜
i
t:T
σ˜−i
t:T
{
T∑
n=t+1
δn−t−1R(X in, A
i
n, Zn)
∣∣∣z1:t, Zt+1, xi1:t, X it+1
}∣∣∣z1:t, xi1:t
}
(29a)
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= Eσ˜
i
t:T
σ˜−i
t:T
{
R(X it , A
i
t, Zt)
+δEσ˜
i
t+1:T
σ˜−i
t+1:T
{
T∑
n=t+1
δn−t−1R(X in, A
i
n, Zn)
∣∣∣z1:t, Zt+1, xi1:t, X it+1
}∣∣∣z1:t, xi1:t
}
(29b)
= Eσ˜
i
t:T
σ˜−i
t:T
{
R(X it , A
i
t, Zt) + δVt+1(Zt+1, X
i
t+1)
∣∣∣z1:t, xi1:t} (29c)
= Eσ˜
i
T
σ˜−i
T
{
R(X it , A
i
t, Zt) + δVt+1(Zt+1, X
i
t+1)
∣∣∣z1:t, xi1:t} (29d)
= Vt(zt, x
i
t), (29e)
(29c) follows from the induction hypothesis in (28), (29d) follows because the random variables
involved in expectation, X it , A
i
t, Zt, Zt+1, X
i
t+1 do not depend on σ˜
i
t+1:Tσ
−i
t+1:T and (29e) follows
from the definition of Vt in (11).
APPENDIX C
We divide the proof into two parts: first we show that the value function V is at least as big
as any reward-to-go function; secondly we show that under the strategy σ˜, reward-to-go is V .
Note that hit := (z1:t, x
i
1:t).
Part 1: For any i ∈ N , σi define the following reward-to-go functions
W σ
i
t (h
i
t) = E
σi,σ˜−i
{
∞∑
n=t
δn−tR(X in, A
i
n, Zn) | h
i
t
}
(30a)
W
σi,T
t (h
i
t) = E
σi,σ˜−i
{
T∑
n=t
δn−tR(X in, A
i
n, Zn) + δ
T+1−tV (ZT+1, X
i
T+1) | h
i
t
}
. (30b)
Since X ,A are finite sets the reward R is absolutely bounded, the reward-to-go W σ
i
t (h
i
t) is finite
∀ i, t, σi, hit.
For any i ∈ N , hit ∈ H
i
t,
V
(
zt, x
i
t
)
−W σ
i
t (h
i
t) =
[
V
(
zt, x
i
t
)
−W σ
i,T
t (h
i
t)
]
+
[
W
σi,T
t (h
i
t)−W
σi
t (h
i
t)
]
(31)
Combining results from Lemmas 4 and 5 in Appendix D, the term in the first bracket in RHS
of (31) is non-negative. Using (30), the term in the second bracket is
(
δT+1−t
)
E
σi,σ˜−i
{
−
∞∑
n=T+1
δn−(T+1)R(X in, A
i
n, Zn) + V (ZT+1, X
i
T+1) | h
i
t
}
. (32)
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The summation in the expression above is bounded by a convergent geometric series. Also, V is
bounded. Hence the above quantity can be made arbitrarily small by choosing T appropriately
large. Since the LHS of (31) does not depend on T , which implies,
V
(
zt, x
i
t
)
≥W σ
i
t (h
i
t). (33)
Part 2: Since the strategy the equilibrium strategy σ˜ generated in (15) is such that σ˜it
depends on hit only through zt and x
i
t, the reward-to-go W
σ˜i
t , at strategy σ˜, can be written (with
abuse of notation) as
W σ˜
i
t (h
i
t) = W
σ˜i
t (zt, x
i
t) = E
σ˜
{
∞∑
n=t
δn−tR(X in, A
i
n, Zn) | zt, x
i
t
}
. (34)
For any hit ∈ H
i
t,
W σ˜
i
t (zt, x
i
t) = E
σ˜
{
R(X it , A
i
t, Zt) + δW
σ˜i
t+1
(
φ(zt, θ[zt])), X
i
t+1
)
| zt, x
i
t
}
(35a)
V (zt, x
i
t) = E
σ˜
{
R(X it , A
i
t, Zt) + δV
(
φ(zt, θ[zt])), X
i
t+1
)
| zt, x
i
t
}
. (35b)
Repeated application of the above for the first n time periods gives
W σ˜
i
t (zt, x
i
t) = E
σ˜

t+n−1∑
m=t
δm−tR(X it , A
i
t, Zt) + δ
nW σ˜
i
t+n
(
Zt+n, X
i
t+n
)
| zt, x
i
t
 (36a)
V (zt, x
i
t) = E
σ˜

t+n−1∑
m=t
δm−tR(X it , A
i
t, Zt) + δ
nV
(
Zt+n, X
i
t+n
)
| zt, x
i
t
. (36b)
Taking differences results in
W σ˜
i
t (zt, x
i
t)− V (zt, x
i
t) = δ
n
E
σ˜
{
W σ˜
i
t+n
(
Zt+n, X
i
t+n
)
− V
(
Zt+n, X
i
t+n
)
| zt, x
i
t
}
. (37)
Taking absolute value of both sides then using Jensen’s inequality for f(x) = |x| and finally
taking supremum over hit reduces to
sup
hit
∣∣∣W σ˜it (zt, xit)− V (zt, xit)∣∣∣ ≤ δn sup
hit
E
σ˜
{∣∣∣W σ˜it+n(Zt+n, X it+n)− V (Zt+n, X it+n)∣∣∣ | zt, xit} .
(38)
Now using the fact that Wt+n, V are bounded and that we can choose n arbitrarily large, we get
suphit |W
σ˜i
t (zt, x
i
t)− V (zt, x
i
t)| = 0.
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APPENDIX D
In this section, we present three lemmas. Lemma 3 is intermediate technical results needed
in the proof of Lemma 4. Then the results in Lemma 4 and 5 are used in Appendix C for the
proof of Theorem 2. The proof for Lemma 3 below isn’t stated as it analogous to the proof
of Lemma 1 from Appendix B, used in the proof of Theorem 1 (the only difference being a
non-zero terminal reward in the finite-horizon model).
Define the reward-to-go W
σi,T
t for any agent i and strategy σ
i as
W
σi,T
t (z1:t, x
i
1:t) = E
σi,σ˜−i
[ T∑
n=t
δn−tR(X in, A
i
n, Zn) + δ
T+1−tG(ZT+1, X
i
T+1) | z1:t, x
i
1:t
]
. (39)
Here agent i’s strategy is σi whereas all other agents use strategy σ˜−i defined above. Since X ,A
are assumed to be finite and G absolutely bounded, the reward-to-go is finite ∀ i, t, σi, z1:t, xi1:t.
In the following, any quantity with a T in the superscript refers the finite horizon model with
terminal reward G.
Lemma 3. For any t ∈ T , i ∈ N , z1:t, xi1:t and σ
i,
V Tt (zt, x
i
t) ≥ E
σi,σ˜−i
[
R(xit, A
i
t, zt) + δV
T
t+1
(
φ(zt, θ[zt]), X
i
t+1
)
| z1:t, x
i
1:t
]
. (40)
The result below shows that the value function from the backwards recursive algorithm is
higher than any reward-to-go.
Lemma 4. For any t ∈ T , i ∈ N , z1:t, xi1:t and σ
i,
V Tt (zt, x
i
t) ≥W
σi,T
t (z1:t, x
i
1:t). (41)
Proof. We use backward induction for this. At time T , using the maximization property from (10)
(modified with terminal reward G),
V TT (zT , x
i
T ) (42a)
, Eγ˜
i,T
T
(·|xi
T
),γ˜−i,T
T
[
R(X iT , A
i
T , ZT ) + δG
(
φ(zT , γ˜
T
T )), X
i
T+1
)
| zT , x
i
T
]
(42b)
≥ Eγ
i,T
T
(·|xi
T
),γ˜−i,T
T
[
R(X iT , A
i
T , ZT ) + δG
(
φ(zT , γ˜
T
T )), X
i
T+1
)
| z1:T , x
i
1:T
]
(42c)
= W σ
i,T
T (h
i
T ) (42d)
Here the second inequality follows from (10) and (11) and the final equality is by definition
in (39).
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Assume that the result holds for all n ∈ {t + 1, . . . , T}, then at time t we have
V Tt (zt, x
i
t) (43a)
≥ Eσ
i
t ,σ˜
−i
t
[
R(X it , A
i
t, Zt) + δV
T
t+1
(
φ(zt, θ[zt]), X
i
t+1
)
| z1:t, x
i
1:t
]
(43b)
≥ Eσ
i
t ,σ˜
−i
t
[
R(X it , A
i
t, Zt) + δE
σi
t+1:T
,σ˜−i
t+1:T
[ T∑
n=t+1
δn−(t+1)R(X in, A
i
n, Zn) (43c)
+ δT−tG(ZT+1, X
i
T+1) | z1:t, x
i
1:t, Zt+1, X
i
t+1
]
| z1:t, x
i
1:t
]
= Eσ
i
t:T
,σ˜−i
t:T
[ T∑
n=t
δn−tR(X in, A
i
n, Zn) + δ
T+1−tG(ZT+1, X
i
T+1) | z1:t, x
i
1:t
]
(43d)
= W σ
i,T
t (z1:t, x
i
1:t) (43e)
Here the first inequality follows from Lemma 3, the second inequality from the induction hypoth-
esis, the third equality follows since the random variables on the right hand side do not depend
on σit , and the final equality by definition (39).
The following result highlights the similarities between the fixed-point equation in infinite-
horizon and the backwards recursion in the finite-horizon.
Lemma 5. Consider the finite horizon game with G ≡ V . Then V Tt = V , ∀ i ∈ N , t ∈ {1, . . . , T}
satisfies the backwards recursive construction stated above (adapted from (10) and (11)).
Proof. Use backward induction for this. Consider the finite horizon algorithm at time t = T ,
noting that V TT+1 ≡ G ≡ V ,
γ˜TT (· | x
i
T ) ∈ arg max
γT (·|xiT )
E
γT (·|x
i
T
)
[
R(xiT , A
i
T , zT ) + δV
(
φ(zT , γ˜
T
t ), X
i
T+1
)
| zT , x
i
T
]
(44a)
V TT (zT , x
i
T ) = E
γ˜T
T
(·|xi
T
)
[
R(xiT , A
i
T , zT ) + δV
(
φ(zT , γ˜
T
t ), X
i
T+1
)
| zT , x
i
T
]
. (44b)
Comparing the above set of equations with (14), we can see that the pair (V, γ˜) arising out
of (14) satisfies the above. Now assume that V Tn ≡ V for all n ∈ {t + 1, . . . , T}. At time t, in
the finite horizon construction from (10), (11), substituting V in place of V Tt+1 from the induction
hypothesis, we get the same set of equations as (44). Thus V Tt ≡ V satisfies it.
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APPENDIX E
Theorem. For the finite horizon game GT , and for every t ∈ {T, T − 1, . . . , 1}, there exists a
solution of the fixed point equation (10).
Proof. γ˜t is solution of the following fixed-point equation, ∀xit ∈ X ,
γ˜t(·|x
i
t) ∈ arg max
γt(·|xit)
E
γt(·|xit)
[
R(xit, A
i
t, zt) + δVt+1(φ(zt, γ˜t), X
i
t+1)|zt, x
i
t
]
(45)
= arg max
γt(·|xit)
∑
ait,x
i
t+1
[
R(xit, a
i
t, zt) + δVt+1(φ(zt, γ˜t), x
i
t+1)
]
γt(a
i
t|x
i
t)Qx(x
i
t+1|x
i
t, a
i
t, zt). (46)
(i) Let B be the space of γ, where γ : X → P(A). Clearly B is convex since it is a space of
probability measures, and compact which is implied by the finiteness of X ,A.
(ii) From (46), we define a correspondence ht : B ⇒ B as follows
ht(γ̂t) = {γ̂t : ∀x
i
t ∈ X , γ̂t(·|x
i
t) ∈ arg max
γt(·|xit)
E
γt(·|xit)
[
R(xit, A
i
t, zt) + δVt+1(φ(zt, γ̂t), X
i
t+1)|zt, x
i
t
]
}
(47)
For all γ̂ ∈ B, ht(γ̂) is non-empty, closed and convex since the optimization in (46) is a linear
program in variables γt(·|xit), which lie in a compact space that is the probability simplex.
(iii) Since the optimization in (46) is linear and thus continuous in γt(·|xit), therefore ht has closed
graph property (from Maximum theorem [18]).
Thus using Kakutani’s fixed-point theorem [19][Lemma 20.1], there exists a solution to (10).
APPENDIX F
Theorem. For the infinite horizon game G∞, there exists a solution of the fixed point equa-
tion (14).
Proof. The fixed point equation in (14) is given as follows.
(γ˜, V ) are solution of the following fixed-point equation, ∀z ∈ Z, γ˜ = θ[z], xi ∈ X ,
γ˜(·|xi) ∈ arg max
γ(·|xi)
E
γ(·|xi)
[
R(xi, Ai, z) + δV (φ(z, γ˜), X i
′
)|z, xi
]
, (48a)
V (z, xi) = Eγ˜(·|x
i)
[
R(xi, Ai, z) + δV (φ(z, γ˜), X i
′
)|z, xi
]
. (48b)
where expectation in 48a is with respect to random variable (Ai, X i,′) through the measure
γ(ai|xi)Qx(xi
′
|xi, ai, z).
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We will prove this theorem in two parts.
Part 1 Recall that θ : Z → (X → P(A)) is an equilibrium generating function which defines
a homogenous Markovian strategy of players σ as σ(ai|z, xi) = θ[z](ai|xi).
We note that V is a bounded function since ||V ||∞ ≤
1
1−δ supxi,ai,z{R(x
i, Ai, z)}. Let V be
the space of all such bounded functions. We consider it with supremum norm || · ||∞.
For any V ∈ V , we define an equilibrium generating function θ(V ) as follows. For any z ∈ Z ,
let γ˜ = θ(V )[z], where γ˜ satisfies the following fixed-point equation,
γ˜(·|xi) ∈ arg max
γ(·|xi)
E
γ(·|xi)
[
R(xi, Ai, z) + δV (φ(z, γ˜), X i
′
)|z, xi
]
, (49)
There exists a fixed-point solution of the above equation by the same arguments as in the proof
of Theorem 3 in Appendix E.
Part 2
We define the following fixed-point equation in V . For z ∈ Z, xi ∈ X i. Then
V (z, xi) = max
γ(·|xi)
E
γ(·|xi)
[
R(xi, Ai, z) + δV (φ(z, θ(V )[z]), X i
′
)|z, xi
]
(50)
= max
γ(·|xi)
∑
ai,xi
′
[
R(xi, ai, z) + δV (φ(z, θ(V )[z]), xi
′
)
]
γ(ai|xi)Q(xi
′
|xi, ai, z) (51)
We define an operator T : V → V as follows:
TV (z, xi) = max
γ(·|xi)
E
γ(·|xi)
[
R(xi, Ai, z) + δV (φ(z, θ(V )[z]), X i
′
)|z, xi
]
(52)
Let
γ∗ ∈ arg max
γ̂(·|xi)
E
γ̂(·|xi)
[
R(xi, Ai, z) + δV1(φ(z, θ
(V1)[z]), X i
′
)|z, xi
]
(53)
Then ,
TV1(z, x
i)− TV2(z, x
i)
= max
γ̂(·|xi)
E
γ̂(·|xi)
[
R(xi, Ai, z) + δV1(φ(z, θ
(V1)[z]), X i
′
)|z, xi
]
− max
γ(·|xi)
E
γ(·|xi)
[
R(xi, Ai, z) + δV2(φ(z, θ
(V2)[z]), X i
′
)|z, xi
]
(54)
≤ Eγ
∗(·|xi)
[
R(xi, Ai, z) + δV1(φ(z, θ
(V1)[z]), X i
′
)|z, xi
]
− Eγ
∗(·|xi)
[
R(xi, Ai, z) + δV2(φ(z, θ
(V2)[z]), X i
′
)|z, xi
]
(55)
≤ δEγ
∗(·|xi)
[
V1(φ(z, θ
(V1)[z]), X i
′
)− V2(φ(z, θ
(V2)[z]), X i
′
)|z, xi
]
(56)
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≤ δ||V1 − V2||∞, (57)
where || · ||∞ is the sup norm. By a similar argument, TV2(z, xi)− TV1(z, xi) ≤ δ||V1 − V2||∞.
Thus T is a contraction mapping. Therefore from Banach fixed-point theorem [18], there exists
a unique fixed point to T , TV = V . Correspondingly, there exists θ(V ) such that γ˜ = θ(V )[z]
together with V is a solution to (14).
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